Healthtech & medical devices
5 client organizations
// PORTFEUILLE CLIENT · Depuis 2026
Portefeuille Client & Constats
Vue sanitisée de 20 organisations clientes couvrant web, mobile, médical, intégré et systèmes réglementés. Les constats sont comptés par occurrence : les classes de vulnérabilité répétées sur différents assets, endpoints ou flux restent séparées. Les secrets et détails opérationnels sont omis.
14
Critique
27
Élevée
17
Moyenne
19
Faible
2
Informationnel
// COUVERTURE CLIENT · 2025-2026
Secteurs clients
20+ organisations
Energy, EV charging & monitoring
2 client organizations
Industrial IoT & embedded systems
2 client organizations
Electronic security & access control
2 client organizations
Web, API & enterprise software
5 client organizations
Identity, AD & cybersecurity
1 client organization
Telecom & public sector
1 client organization
Payment & transaction systems
1 client organization
IT infrastructure & information systems
1 client organization
// INDEX ANONYMISÉ DES CLIENTS
Portefeuille client
20 alias clients · 2025-2026
Client A
2026Healthtech & medical devices
35 constats distincts
2 rédactions publiques
Client B
2025-2026Healthtech & medical devices
12 constats distincts
3 rédactions publiques
Client C
2026Energy, EV charging & monitoring
35 constats distincts
2 rédactions publiques
Client D
2025Healthtech & medical devices
3 constats distincts
1 rédaction publique
Client E
2025Industrial IoT & embedded systems
2 constats distincts
1 rédaction publique
Client F
2025Healthtech & medical devices
Constats non publiés
0 rédactions publiques
Client G
2025Web, API & enterprise software
Constats non publiés
0 rédactions publiques
Client H
2025Healthtech & medical devices
Constats non publiés
0 rédactions publiques
Client I
2025Telecom & public sector
Constats non publiés
0 rédactions publiques
Client J
2025Electronic security & access control
Constats non publiés
0 rédactions publiques
Client K
2025Electronic security & access control
Constats non publiés
0 rédactions publiques
Client L
2025Web, API & enterprise software
Constats non publiés
0 rédactions publiques
Client M
2025Identity, AD & cybersecurity
1 constat distinct
1 rédaction publique
Client N
2025IT infrastructure & information systems
Constats non publiés
0 rédactions publiques
Client O
2025Industrial IoT & embedded systems
Constats non publiés
0 rédactions publiques
Client P
2025Payment & transaction systems
Constats non publiés
0 rédactions publiques
Client Q
2025Web, API & enterprise software
3 constats distincts
1 rédaction publique
Client R
2025Web, API & enterprise software
2 constats distincts
2 rédactions publiques
Client S
2025Energy, EV charging & monitoring
Constats non publiés
0 rédactions publiques
Client T
2025Web, API & enterprise software
Constats non publiés
0 rédactions publiques
// CONSTATS 2025
Constats de première année
14 constats · 6 engagements
Client B · 20253 constats · 2 rédactions
Healthtech & medical devices
Medical imaging workstation, DICOM services and licensing workflow.
- → Unauthenticated DICOM service exposed a parser denial of service through deeply nested sequences.
- → Kiosk escape, weak local privilege boundaries and unsigned safety parameters created a device-compromise chain.
Client D · 20253 constats · 1 rédaction
Healthtech & medical devices
Regulated web application and file-import workflow.
- → SVG upload validation bypass enabled stored client-side script execution.
- → Unauthenticated API information exposure and export workflow weaknesses increased data-leak risk.
Client E · 20252 constats · 1 rédaction
Industrial IoT & embedded systems
ARM gateway, boot chain and exposed debug interfaces.
- → Unsigned boot configuration remained outside the verified-boot boundary.
- → An exposed UART console allowed a physical attacker to reach a privileged recovery path.
Client M · 20251 constat · 1 rédaction
Identity, AD & cybersecurity
Active Directory delegation and privileged-object security review.
- → Excessive permissions on AdminSDHolder created a persistence and domain-administration escalation path.
Client Q · 20253 constats · 1 rédaction
Web, API & enterprise software
Web application, upload processing and XML parsing surface.
- → Recursive XML entity expansion caused resource exhaustion and repeated server errors.
- → Permissive cross-origin policy and verbose error responses increased information exposure.
Client R · 20252 constats · 2 rédactions
Web, API & enterprise software
Angular business application, document uploads and account workflows.
- → Stored XSS through upload filtering bypass could reach authenticated users and sessions.
- → Broken access control exposed account impersonation and document-download paths.
// MISSIONS
Cinq surfaces d’attaque
79 constats · sanitisation pour divulgation publique
28 Aug - 04 Sep 202618 constats · 1 critical · 2 high · 2 medium · 12 low · 1 info
Client A - Mobile, API & public web
Mobile application, Firebase, HR backend and public web surface.
- → Embedded secrets chained into Firebase access, HR backend exposure and account takeover.
- → Unauthenticated REST proxy and missing login rate limiting.
- → PII exposure, exposed diagnostics and weak mobile resilience controls.
09 - 11 Sep 202617 constats · 5 critical · 5 high · 3 medium · 4 low
Client A - HR extranet & backend
Authenticated extranet and HR backend authorization model.
- → Cross-domain IDOR/BOLA exposed user, employee and document records at scale.
- → Authentication secrets were returned in clear JSON responses.
- → Unauthorized document deletion, upload impersonation and missing MFA on SSO admin access.
August 20269 constats · 6 medium · 3 low
Client B - Medical ultrasound platform
Ultrasound workstation, kiosk boundary, licensing and compiled application code.
- → Kiosk escape reached Windows Explorer and a shell from a physical authenticated session.
- → Boost token deserialization occurred before signature verification.
- → Compiled code, development paths and weak admin protection increased reverse-engineering risk.
202617 constats · 6 critical · 10 high · 1 medium
Client C - Connected charging station
Connected charging station assessed against EN 18031-1:2024.
- → Unsigned firmware and engineering-grade Android configuration enabled arbitrary firmware installation.
- → Persistent storage exposed credentials, keys, badges and operational history.
- → Weak authentication, cleartext channels and exposed remote services expanded the attack surface.
202618 constats · 2 critical · 10 high · 5 medium · 1 info
Client C - Embedded charging station
Embedded charging station, dashboard, TLV protocol and debug interfaces.
- → Privileged TLV commands were accepted without authentication.
- → Open JTAG/SBW and missing secure boot enabled firmware dump and reprogramming.
- → Predictable credentials, replayable RFID frames, cleartext HTTP and stored XSS weakened the control plane.
Des rapports détaillés sont disponibles sur demande dans le cadre de l'accord de divulgation applicable. Les rédactions publiques ne contiennent que des enseignements techniques sanitisés et un contexte défensif reproductible.